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AN EVALUATION OF THE CASE AGAINST NATIONAL INCOME INSURANCE
John B. Williamson
Boston College
In an earlier paper I outlined a proposal for a national
income insurance plan and discussed the strengths of the approach
(Williamson,1974c). Income insurance is a special case of the
negative income tax or more generally of the guaranteed income.
Negative income tax proposals of any kind are open to a variety
of criticisms from both the left and the right. The national
income insurance plan is no exception. In the present paper an
attempt is made to anticipate and deal with the major arguments
against the plan. Many of these arguments are equally applicable
to other guaranteed income proposals. For this reason the paper
is in large measure an evaluation of the major arguments against
the guaranteed income approach to income maintenance.
THE PROPOSAL
This section is a description of the national income insurance
plan as previously outlined. The plan is so named because it would
provide social insurance benefits whenever individual or family
income fell below a specified level.
Initially the program would provide a guaranteed
income equal to 25 percent of the median family
income adjusted for family size in the same way
the Social Security Administration's poverty
index is adjusted. All other income would be
taxed at a rate of 50 percent until the breakeven
point was reached. Above the breakeven point the
current tax schedule would be used. Assuming that
such a program were introduced in 1975 and the median
income were $12,000 for a family of four, the
guaranteed minimum income would be $3,000 and the break-
even point would be $6,000. Those with other sources
of income of less than $6,000 would receive a net
payment; many with incomes just above $6,000 would
pay less tax than under the current tax system.
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There would be no employment requirement for
those unable to work due to family responsibilities,
poor health, or age; but other recipients would be
required to obtain employment in the private
sector, to accept one of the guaranteed jobs that
would be created by the government, or to participate
in some form of alternative service (e.g. job
training, adult education, VISTA, something like the
old WPA's writers' project, etc.).
The program would originally add less than $10
billion to the federal budget. Half of this
would be raised by a payroll tax similar to that
presently used to finance the social security
program. The rest would be financed out of
general federal revenues. A similar procedure
has been proposed to finance Kennedy's national
health insurance plan.
Central to the national income insurance plan
is the provision for increasing the magnitude
of the guaranteed minimum income. The level
would be uniformly incremented from the
original 25 percent to 50 percent of the
median income ten years after the introduction
of the program. The cost would increase to
approximately $80 billion per year (Williamson,
1974c).
THE CASE AGAINST THE PROPOSAL
The plan would fuel the fires of inflation. Any program
with a built in cost of living increase tends to exert some
inflationary pressure; the procedure called for in this plan which
bases increases on changes in the median income would exert even
greater inflationary pressure. In the not too distant past such
a criticism would have been dismissed with the reply that
appropriate fiscal and monitary counter measures could be used to
keep the resulting inflationary pressure within reasonable limits.
But the events of recent years suggest that inflation is more
difficult to deal with than had been thought only a few years ago.
The evidence that inflation has become a world problem makes an
analysis which focuses on the inadequacy of measures taken by any
one government somewhat suspect.
In defense of the national income insurance plan we can
argue that the low initial guaranteed income and the provision
that the level of this guaranteed income be incremented gradually
are measures designed to deal with the inflation issue. The
impact of the original progrun would be minimal. The increase in
the level of the guaranteed minimum income over the years would
be sufficiently gradual to allow time to take measures to keep
inflation to a politically acceptable level. In a period of high
inflation one such measure might be the suspension of the provision
for incrementing the guaranteed minimum income or a temporary
shift to a more gradual method.
The procedure which has been suggested for incrementing the
guaranteed minimum income is only one of several possible alternatives.
It establishes two basic precedents. One is that the magnitude of
the guaranteed minimum income be increased in some way each year
so as to take into consideration increases in incomes generally.
The other is that the gap between those at the bottom of the income
distribution and the median income be gradually reduced.
A less ambitious alternative which might prove politically
more feasible during a period of high inflation would be to
increment the guaranteed minimum income so as to keep it at some
specified percentage of the median income. This would lead to a
gradual improvement in the standard of living provided, but it would
not reduce the gap between the guaranteed minimum income and the
median income. On the contrary, the dollar gap would gradually
increase over time.
A still less ambitious alternative would be to include a
provision for incrementing the level of the guaranteed minimum
income so as to take into consideration increases in the cost
of living. This would protect recipients against a decrease in
standard of living due to inflation; but it would not lead to
any improvement in living standards. Since the guaranteed minimum
income in the initial proposal is substantially below the poverty
line, this alternative would not achieve the objective of assuring
at least a minimally adequate standard of living for all Americans
at some point in the not too distant future.
Another response to the inflation argument against the
national income insurance plan is to note that the existence of
a program which would provide a guaranteed income adjusted for
increases in the median income would reduce the need for keeping
inflation low. A major reason often mentioned for keeping it low
is to protect those living off a low fixed income. But many of
these people would do better under the national income insurance
plan with a moderate level of inflation than they would without
it even if inflation were kept substantially lower.
One widely held theory is that any guaranteed income plan which
would provide even a minimally adequate standard of living would
be so inflationary as to be politically unacceptable. We do not
at present have the evidence that would be needed to conclusively
prove or disprove this theory. The national income insurance plan
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represents an effort to start at a level which admittedly does not
provide a minimally adequate standard of living, but to gradually
improve this standard in an effort to test and hopefuly disprove
the theory.
The plan would seriously undermine work incentives. The
work incentive question can be raised with respect to any guaranteed
income proposal. The potential impact is greater for proposals which
do not include an employment requirement. But even when there is an
employment requirement, the economic security provided is likely to
reduce work incentives for at least some workers. The existence of
such a program would facilitate life styles based on frequent
movement into and out of the labor force. It would reduce anxiety
about economic security in the future and thus reduce the incentive
to put money away for retirement or disability in old age. For
those already retired such a program would reduce the incentive to
live frugally and seek support from relatives in the effort to avoid
public dependency.
While there is some concern about the impact of a guaranteed
income on the behavior of the aged and substantial concern about
the impact on the behavior of the poor, it is likely that the
greatest concern would be with its impact on youth, particularly the
disenchanted, non-dues paying children of the middle class. This
group in growing numbers is partaking of AFDC and food stamps
without reluctance. A common pattern is to obtain temporary
employment and after saving some money to quit work until these
funds are exhausted. The security of knowing that there would be
a government job waiting would undoubtedly increase the number of
persons adopting this life style. Any visable trend in this
direction would prove very unpopular with middle America. Even a
modest movement in this direction which was given extensive media
coverage could lead to intense resentments among those who are
committed to work and the work ethic. A marked cleavage would
develop between those who chose public dependency and those who
chose self-sufficiency. This in turn would lead to the demand that
the program be rescinded or severly cut back.
Another aspect of the incentives debate is the potential
impact on the work effort of those in the middle and upper income
categories who would be bearing a substantial share of the program's
cost. Persons in the higher income brackets would be subjected
to an increase in their tax burden. This would reduce the economic
incentives for hard work. From the perspective of the functional
theory of stratification (Davis and Moore, 1945), the argument
would be made that a reduction in economic incentives could result
in a shortage of qualified persons willing to fill these positions
of high responsibility in our society. However available evidence
from studies of the effects of high income tax rates on those in
the upper income brackets suggests that any reduction in work effort
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would be minimal (Sanders,1951; Break,1957; Barlow, et al.,19 66 ;
Green,1967: 113-137).
The national income insurance plan was drawn up with the work
incentive issue very much in mind. Initially the program would call
for a very modest guaranteed minimum income. It would be a rare
individual who would find living on the guaranteed income provided
a viable alternative to a job that paid a decent wage. Also the
plan includes an employment requirement. As has been mentioned,
this does not eliminate possible disincentive effects, but it
serves to discourage those who would prefer not to work at all.
The program would be financed in part by a payroll tax similar
to the tax used to finance the social security program; this would
reduce the extent to which it was viewed as a welfare program.
As the guaranteed income was increased, the potential for an impact
on work incentives would also increase. But the provision that the
increase be gradual would allow time to take steps to deal with
any serious disincentive effects that might develop.
While there is no conclusive evidence that a program which
provided a minimally adequate standard of living would not also
involve substantial work disincentives, there is evidence which
suggests that the work incentive problem would not be as severe as
some would have us believe. Macarov(1970:220-226) has done an
extensive review of the literature on work incentives and concludes
that the poor will continue to work as long as there is a reasonable
increase in disposable income for this work effort. There have been
many studies of work motivation among manual workers and money is
repeatedly found to be a very important motivator (e.g. Kornhauser,
1965; Dubin,1958). This data has been used to argue that a guaranteed
income would reduce work incentives. But this same evidence is also
consistent with the conclusion that there would be very little dis-
incentive. All we have to assume is that the worker would get money
over and above the guaranteed income from his employment. This
would be the case with the national income insurance plan.
The strongest evidence that presently exists to argue against
the work disincentive hypothesis comes from the recently completed
New Jersey-Pennsylvania negative income tax experiment (Rees,1974).
This study involved providing a negative income tax program for
several hundred low income families over a period of three years.
They found some reduction in work effort, but the reduction was
small to the point of being quite insignificant, particularly
among men. The impact was more substantial among women in families
with a husband present. Caution is in order with respect to
generalization from such a short term experiment, but it does
provide the most compelling evidence presently available on the
incentive issue.
All negative income tax proposals include a relatively high
marginal tax rate on earned income below the breakeven point.
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Proposed tax rates range from 33 percent (McGovern,1972) to 90
percent (Theobald,1963). The 50 percent tax rate associated with
the national income insurance is not unusually high. However,
the high marginal tax rate is certainly another aspect of the
incentives debate. The most relevant data on this issue again
comes from the New Jersey-Pennsylvania negative income tax
experiment. That study finds that tax rates of up to 50 percent
do not substantially reduce work effort (Rees,1974). This is
consistent with previous studies of the effect of high marginal
tax rates on work incentives for those in high income groups
(Sanders,1951; Break,1957; Barlow, et al.,1966; Green,1967).
The plan does not assure movement from dependency to self-
sufficiency. The employment provision is an effort to encourage
self-sufficiency, but the provision calling for a government
supported guaranteed job leaves open the possibility that many
workers will develop poor work habits knowing that if they are
fired from a job in the private sector, there will always be a
government job available. Unless these government jobs were
administered rather strictly, it is possible workers would develop
work habits that were not at all suitable for jobs in the private
sector. These poor work habits might well be passed on from
one generation to the next. Were evidence to emerge that the
program was fostering dependency, particularly intergenerational
dependency, the program would become highly vulnerable to
curtailment.
To minimize this source of vulnerability efforts would have
to be taken to encourage long run self-sufficiency. One
alternative would be through forms of alternative service (it will
be recalled that this is an alternative to taking a guaranteed
job or private sector job) which provide the job training and
education needed for attractive jobs in the private sector.
Another alternative is to create guaranteed jobs which provide
experience and skills which are in demand in the private sector.
While such measures would be appropriate, it is important to
bear in mind that national income insurance is not being proposed
as a replacement for the manpower and educational programs which
are presently used to prepare people for self-sufficiency. Such
programs would be retained and continue to meet a very definite
need.
The plan would prove disruptive to the economy. In addition
to the problems of inflation and reduced work incentives, both of
which are potentially disruptive factors, it is likely that many
who are presently in the low-wage "dirty-work" jobs would quit.
Some of these workers would undoubtedly qualify for exemption from
the employment requirement due to disability, age, or family
responsibilities. Others would find the security and working
conditions of a government guaranteed job more attractive.
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Many industries depend on paying low wages in order to remain
competitive, particularly with foreign producers. The existence of
a viable alternative for the existing pool of low-wage workers would
lead to the collapse of many producers dependent on this labor source.
This would be disruptive in many ways. It would contribute to the
unemployment problem and put pressure on the government to increase
the number of government supported jobs available. Many of the
services and products presently supplied by low-wage industries
would increase in cost or be replaced by higher priced more capital
intensive alternatives. This would contribute to inflation.
The provision that the national income insurance plan start at
a modest level is an attempt to deal with this problem. The gradual
rate at which the guaranteed minimum income would be increased
allows time for measures to deal with any disruption that might
occur.
Any provision for automatic yearly increments in the guaranteed
minimum income is politically unfeasible. It is no accident that
there is no provision for automatic increments in social security
benefits. Congress wants the power to decide when increments are
made. Such increments are often used by incumbents as vote getters
in election years. Congress also wants to take into consideration
the general state of the economy. There would be pressure to limit
increases in the guaranteed income if there were evidence that the
program was substantially contributing to inflation, unemployment,
or the collapse of certain industries.
The provision in the national income insurance plan for
automatic increases in the guaranteed minimum income might well
make it politically unfeasible. But if this provision were eliminated
in the effort to increase political support for the plan, its
potential long run impact on the distribution of income and political
influence would be drastically curtailed. The dependence of the
plan on there being a provision for automatic yearly increments in
the level of the guaranteed minimum income and the likely strength
of the opposition to such a provision is probably the greatest
weakness of the plan.
A possible fall back compromise that would not entirely
emasculate the program would be to replace the provision for an
automatic yearly increment with a provision calling for increments
to be voted on yearly by Congress with the goal of increasing the
guaranteed minimum income from 25 to 50 percent of the median income
within approximately 10 years. During periods of severe inflation
the decision might well be to only make adjustments for increases
in the median income; thus the guaranteed minimum income might stay
at 30 percent for two or three years and the goal of a guaranteed
minimum income equal to 50 percent of the median income might take
15 rather than 10 years to achieve.
The plan does not make provision for the needs of special
segments of the population. For example, a person who is blind
and poor may require a higher guaranteed minimum income than a
poor person who is not blind, all other things being equal. A
case can also be made for variation in the guaranteed income due
an individual based on age (Rainwater, 1973).
A major assumption underlying all guaranteed income proposals
is that a flat benefit level should be adequate for most of those
who are poor. But those who advocate such programs also admit
that there would be special cases, particularly related to disability
and medical problems, when a person would require more than the
standard benefits. To this end some form of residual welfare program
would have to be retained.
While it is true that the proposed national income insurance
plan does not take into consideration variation in special needs,
the program would go further toward meeting the needs of the entire
low income population than does the existing public welfare system
with its arbitrary variations in payment levels between states and
categories of the welfare population.
The plan would encourage high fertility among those with the
lowest incomes. Since benefits would be a function of family size,
there would be an incentive for the poorest families to have many
children. At a minimum there would be a reduction in the incentive
to take measures to limit family size. This might lead to a marked
increase in the relative proportion of the total population living
in poor families or to the growth of a vast "welfare class".
The fertility argument against guaranteed income plans is
based in part on the belief that many women presently on welfare
are having illegitimate children in the effort to increase their
welfare benefits. Feagin(1972) has carefully reviewed the
available evidence and rejects this conclusion. A related mis-
conception is that welfare families are large, whereas in actuality
the average AFDC family includes only 2.6 children (Williamson,1974a).
Another source of indirect evidence on the fertility issue
is the data as to the effect of family allowances on fertility. A
family allowance is a payment to a family based on the number of
children in the family; the payment ceases when the child reaches
adult status. The United States is one of the few Western nations
without a family allowance program. Available evidence suggest
that family allowances have little if any impact on fertility even
when the conscious effort is made to use the allowance as a
fertility incentive (Schorr,1966:65-84; Vadakin,1968:95-101). In
most countries the family allowance benefits are quite modest and
they are only available as long as there are children in the
family. These factors limit the utility of this data source for
making estimates as to the possible fertility impact of a more
substantial guaranteed income program.
Our understanding of shifts in fertility trends is far from
complete. From past experience it is clear that economic factors
can be important. It is entirely possible that the introduction
of a guaranteed income plan, particularly a generous plan, could
spark a reversal of the recent downtrend in fertility among the
poor. But the indirect evidence that is presently available
suggests that any impact the national income insurance plan might
have on fertility would be insignificant.
Initially the plan would not provide even a minimally adequate
standard of living. If we use the poverty line as a measure of
adequacy, this criticism is quite valid. One reply is that the plan
would increase the standard of living for many while decreasing it
for relatively few. If this plan were introduced, it would replace
several existing welfare program including AFDC. In some states
families would suffer a reduction in living standard unless a state
program were introduced to supplement the federal program, but
most of those who would be forced to live on $3,000 per year are
living on less than that today. Another reply is that while several
negative income tax plans have been proposed which would assure
a more adequate standard of living, their cost generally makes them
politically unfeasible. The national income insurance plan would
not provide an adequate living standard initially, but within ten
years it would provide a standard of living which would be substantially
more adequate than that which would be provided by any proposal which
is politically feasible today.
The plan would force the poor to do society's dirty-work jobs
at very low wages. Gans(1972) argues that one of the functions of
poverty for the nonpoor is to assure that society's dirty work
gets done cheaply. Any guaranteed income program with an employment
requirement has the potential for being used to force the poor to
do unpleasant menial work for low wages. The alternative service
option in the national income insurance plan is an effort to deal
with this problem. If a variety of alternative service options are
available to the recipient, the choice made is less likely to be
perceived as forced labor. The availability of these options also
serves as an incentive to those creating the guaranteed jobs, an
employment option which will be competing with the alternative
service option, to make these jobs attractive. The guaranteed
income component of the plan will make it possible for recipients
to move from one region of the country to another; this will
further broaden the range of available job options.
Considerable stigma would come to be associated with
participation in the program. The stigma would be greatest for
those who chose to participate in the guaranteed job program or
one of the alternative service options which was restricted to
national income insurance recipients. The stigma would be greater
for these categories of recipients because their recipient status
would be the most visable.
It is not possible to accurately predict how stigmatized the
program would come to be. But public opinion data do exist
which suggest that both guaranteed income and guaranteed job
programs would be considerably less stigmatized than is the AFDC
program (Williamson,1974b). The following aspects of the national
income insurance program should contribute to reducing the stigma
associated with being a recipient; (1) the recipient would be
able to hold a job in the private sector and receive an income
supplement check in the mail in the same way pension and social
security payments are received; (2) the program would be financed
in part by a payroll tax thus contributing to a definition of the
benefits as having been earned; (3) there would be no corps of
caseworkers making unannounced visits associated with the program.
The payroll tax to be used in financing the program is highly
regressive. Half of the funds for the program would be generated
using a tax scheme modelled on the present social security tax.
But as Pechman (1969) points out the social security tax is highly
regressive. In 1968 the burden ranged for 7.6 percent for those in
the under $2,000 per year income category down to I percent for
those in the $50,000 and over category (Herriot and Miller,1971).
Since 1968 the payroll tax has substantially increased making the
burden even less equitably distributed.
The major reason for proposing a tax comparable to the present
social security tax to pay for part of the program is that it
would contribute to the definition of the program as "income
insurance" rather than as "welfare." This distinction is not
minor. The American public is much more receptive to programs
such as social security and national health insurance, which are
viewed as benefitting all segments of the population, than to
programs designed for or restricted to the poor. The poor stand
to gain much more from programs that are designed for a wide
spectrum of the population than from programs that are for the
welfare population only.
The inequity of the proposed tax scheme could be substantially
reduced if all sources of income (not just earned income) and if
total income (not just the first $12,600 per year) were subject to
the tax. The inequity could also be reduced by a gradual increase
in the proportion of the burden financed out of general federal
revenues. The provision that 50 percent of the burden be paid out
of general revenues at the outset serves to facilitate such a shift.
The plan would do very little to alter the inequality in the
distribution of wealth in America. Most of those who would favor
a more equitable distribution of income feel that the extent of the
inequality in the distribution of wealth is an equally if not more
important issue. The income insurance plan would have a substantial
impact on the distribution of income, but very little impact on the
distribution of wealth. Other strategies including higher
inheritance taxes and the elimination of various loopholes in the
present inheritance tax system would be more effective for reducing
the extent of the inequality in the distribution of wealth. A
possible modification of the proposal to deal with this criticism
would be to include as taxable income an imputed income equal to
5 (or 10) percent of all assets above a specified level, such as
$50,000.
CONCLUSION
In this paper an effort has been made to answer the major
arguments against the national income insurance plan. Where
evidence exists that can be used to evaluate the validity of these
arguments it has been cited. Unfortunately this evidence is
often quite indirect. As an advocate of income insurance and of
the guaranteed income approach to income maintenance more generally,
I would like to be able to conclude that all the major arguments
have been considered, have been found wanting, and can now be
dismissed. But such a conclusion is not warranted on the basis of
existing evidence. Many unknowns remain to be worked out after a
guaranteed income program is introduced. If such a program is
introduced on a modest scale and gradually increased in scope,
the opportunity to effectively deal with the problems that arise
will be maximized.
To those who favor the guaranteed income approach but are
unwilling to support the introduction of a program which does not
assure a substantial guaranteed income at the outset (say a
guaranteed income of at least 50 percent of the median income), I
have two notes of caution: (1) The price of ideological purity
could be an indefinite postponement of the introduction of a
guaranteed income. It is all too easy for those who are not poor
to urge those who are to wait until a more ambitious plan is
politically feasible. (2) If an ambitious guaranteed income
program were introduced at the outset, the risk of serious social
and economic disruption would be high. The problems created
might be sufficiently severe to force a rescinding of the program
and to result in discrediting of the guaranteed income approach
for years to come.
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